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London mayor Boris Johnson was born in New York City in 1964 to
British parents. His father studied at Columbia University and
subsequently took a job at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. In 1969
the family returned to the United Kingdom where Johnson has lived as a
British citizen since. Forty-five years later, he sold his townhouse in
London at a hefty profit, only to face a capital gains tax bill from the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service. Even though Johnson had not resided in the
United States since the age of five, he was still a U.S. citizen by virtue of
his birth there, and U.S. citizens are subject to capital gains taxes without
regard to place of residence. At first, Johnson sought to renounce his U.S.
citizenship without paying the bill. In the end, he relented.1
Johnson’s story is notable only because he is a public figure. Many so-
called “accidental Americans”—those born with U.S. citizenship but
lacking meaningful social connections to the United States in adulthood—
* Charles R. Weiner Professor of Law, Temple University Law School. This essay
was presented as a paper at the Taxation and Citizenship Conference, University of Michigan
Law School, October 9, 2015. My thanks to Reuven Avi-Yonah and Allison Christians for
organizing the event.
1. See David A. Graham, London Mayor Boris Johnson Hates the IRS, Too, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/boris-
Johnson-renounces-us-citizenship-tax-bill-mayor-london/385554/. Johnson indicated that he
planned to renounce his U.S. citizenship as part of the deal. See Boris Johnson Clears Way to
Number 10 by Renouncing US Passport, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/politics/conservative/11413801/Boris-Johnson-clears-way-to-Number-10-by-re
nouncing-US-passport.html. When he returned to the limelight as a leading exponent of
Britain’s exit from the EU there was speculation that he remained a U.S. citizen. See Ylan Q,
Mui, Boris Johnson Won’t Run for British Prime Minister but May Be Able to Run for U.S.
President, WASH. POST (July 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/
07/01/boris-johnson-wont-be-britains-prime-minister-but-he-could-be-americas-president/.
His renunciation was recently confirmed with the inclusion of his name on a quarterly U.S.
Treasury Department list of individuals who have lost their U.S. citizenship. See 82 Fed. Reg.
10185, 10199 (Feb. 9, 2017); Patrick Wintour, Boris Johnson Among Record Number to
Renounce American Citizenship During 2016, Guardian, Feb. 9, 2017.
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face significant tax liabilities notwithstanding the tenuous tie.2 At one
level, this is nothing new: tax obligations have always applied to citizens
abroad. But these obligations were largely honored in the breach. Recent
administrative and legislative reforms have ramped up enforcement
against U.S. citizens abroad. Some, like Boris Johnson, have managed to
square up their tax obligations on the way to cutting the citizenship tie and
the prospect of future liabilities. Many others are cowering in the shadows,
fearful of being discovered on past noncompliance and thus unwilling to
initiate the renunciation process.
The United States is the only country in the world to tax its citizens
resident abroad.3 Whatever one thinks of this exceptional approach as a
general matter,4 it seems least defensible as applied to those who are not
Americans in any sociological sense. The unfairness could be corrected
through changes to the tax law, carving out from its coverage at least those
who never had ties or who have permanently severed ties to the
homeland. It could also be corrected through citizenship practice.
Citizenship practices are increasingly situated in the realm of
international law. What was once conceded to be in the exclusive
2. See, e.g., Neil Gandal, Why Does Uncle Sam Hate American Expats?, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 15, 2014, 6:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/neil-gandal-why-does-uncle-sam-hate-
american-expats-1418687615; Amber Hildebrandt, U.S. FATCA Law Catches Unsuspecting
Canadians in Its Crosshairs, CBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2014),  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/u-s-
fatca-tax-law-catches-unsuspecting-canadians-in-its-crosshairs-1.2493864.; Coleen Jaffy, The
Law that Makes U.S. Expats Toxic, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-law-that-makes-u-s-expats-toxic-1444330827; Sophia Yan, Uncle Sam Says My Swedish
Kid Is American, CNN MONEY (Mar. 11, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/10/pf/taxes/us-
expat-kids-citizenship-tax/.
3. Eritrea is sometimes paired with the United States as another state that imposes
tax obligations on its citizens abroad. See, e.g., End the American Expat Tax, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (April 24, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-04-24/end-the-
american-expat-tax (“Does the U.S. really want to share this distinction with Eritrea?”).
Eritrea does attempt to impose a 2% “diaspora tax,” but the Eritrea tax has been condemned
by no less than the U.N. Security Council for being collected through extortion and other
illicit means and for being put to use in destabilizing the Horn of Africa. See S.C. Res. 2023,
¶¶ 10-11 (Dec. 5, 2011); see also Sam Jones, Diaspora Tax for Eritreans Living in UK
Investigated by Metropolitan Police, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015), https://
www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/09/eritrea-diaspora-tax-uk-investigated-
metropolitan-police (reporting coercive means used by Eritrean embassy in London to
collect the tax). The coupling thus seems inappropriate given the anomaly of the Eritrean
case. No other developed economy imposes a worldwide tax on a citizenship basis.
4. See Michael S. Kirsch, Citizens Abroad and Social Cohesion at Home: Refocusing a
Cross-Border Tax Policy Debate, VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2017) (https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2669543); compare, e.g., Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 177 (2016) (describing citizenship taxation as “out of step” with a
globalizing world), with Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation:
Citizenship as Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1289-91 (2011)
(asserting an administrative convenience of citizenship criterion).
Winter 2017] Citizenship Overreach 169
discretion of states5 has become the target of human rights activism.6
Advocates are articulating a right of “access to citizenship” for habitual
residents.7 A spate of recently proposed and adopted measures allowing
for the deprivation of citizenship on security or other grounds has
attracted heavy fire.8 This activity has been exclusively directed at cases
involving the denial or deprivation of citizenship. The critique orients
around citizenship as a vehicle for perfecting rights and equality.9
Through this optic, citizenship is an unalloyed good and citizenship
policy cannot be too generous. That should not be too surprising. For the
most part, citizenship now comes at no or low cost, at least from the
individual’s perspective. The distinctive obligations of citizenship are
few.10 Citizenship, in most cases, will get you more than it takes. Few
countries, for example, maintain once-common mandatory military service
policies, and most of those that do will exempt non-resident citizens.11 At
the same time that there are no costs associated with citizenship, there are
typically some benefits. At the very least, citizens enjoy a right to enter
their country,12 and through citizenship will often have privileged entry
rights in other countries.13 Citizens are also often entitled to other
advantages under domestic law.
5. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L
L. 694, 697-98 (2011) [hereinafter Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship] .
6. For instance, the Dominican Republic has been condemned for denying citizenship
to persons of Haitian ethnicity born in Dominican territory. See, e.g., We Are Dominican:
Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality in the Dominican Republic, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 1,
2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/07/01/we-are-dominican/arbitrary-deprivation-
nationality-dominican-republic.
7. See Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, supra note 5, at 717.
8. See, e.g., Matthew J. Gibney, Should Citizenship Be Conditional? The Ethics of
Denationalization, 75 J. POL. 646, 654-57 (2013) (criticizing UK expatriation measures).
France dropped a proposal to strip convicted terrorists of citizenship that had been floated in
the wake of the Paris attacks. See Paris Attacks: Hollande Drops Plans to Strip Nationality,
BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35924701. A new
government in Canada has stated its intention to repeal a measure enacted in 2015. Tom
Parry, Liberals Move to Overhaul Rules on Revoking, Granting Citizenship, CBC NEWS (Feb.
25, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-mccallum-citizenship-act-repeal-bill-
1.3463471. Such proposals have made little headway in the United States. See Peter J. Spiro,
Expatriating Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2180 (2014).
9. See, e.g., James A Goldston, Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination,
Citizenship, and the Rights of Noncitizens, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 321 (2006).
10. See generally Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of
Citizenship, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 899 (2013) [hereinafter Spiro, The (Dwindling)
Rights and Obligations of Citizenship].
11. See Joshua Hall & Danko Tarabar, Explaining the Worldwide Decline in Military
Conscription: 1970-2010 (W. Va. Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper Series 15-30, 2015),
http://www.be.wvu.edu/phd_economics/pdf/15-30.pdf.
12. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12(4), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.”).
13. Entry and movement rights associated with citizenship are the primary incentive to
secure multiple citizenship, especially where a person holding a citizenship with a low level of
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So it has been with U.S. citizenship. Taxes aside, U.S. citizenship costs
nothing to retain. The burden has been light and benefits clear if not
always immediate. Most importantly, U.S. citizenship guarantees the right
to enter the United States.14 That is valuable even for those who have no
social ties to the United States or foreseeable plans to relocate there.
Avoiding the hassles of having to apply for a visa, even for a tourist trip, is
a nontrivial benefit.15 For those who might take advantage of it for
business or education, it might be worth something more.
But, in many cases, those benefits will not be worth anything close to
the cost of complying with the new overseas tax regime. In the past, even
those who complied often paid only a small price.16 This was especially
true of middle earners, for whom foreign tax credits reduced the bite of
U.S. tax exposure.17 Today, although the magnitude of tax liability
remains unchanged, additional reporting requirements have added a
significant administrative burden. Enforcement of reporting requirements
under the Bank Secrecy Act was dramatically stepped up in the wake of 9/
11, with the adoption of heavy penalties for failure to file Foreign Bank
Account Reports (FBAR) for accounts with more than $10,000.18 In 2010,
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) added additional
reporting requirements for those with overseas assets.19 These regimes
apply equally to citizens resident in the United States and abroad, but fall
associated travel and settlement rights is eligible for a citizenship with a high level of such
rights. See generally Yossi Harpaz, Ancestry into Opportunity: How Global Inequality Drives
Demand for Long-Distance European Union Citizenship, 41 J. ETHNIC AND MIGRATION
STUD. 2081, 2099 (2015) (demonstrating the correlation between relative mobility rights and
an inclination to claim dual citizenship on the basis of descent); Henley & Partners,
Methodology, QUALITY OF NATIONALITY INDEX, https://www.nationalityindex.com/#
(ranking the value of nationalities and taking account of the “sheer number of other
jurisdictions where one can travel to or settle in while holding a particular nationality”).
14. See, e.g., Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1964).
15. Witness, for example, the recent outcry over the withdrawal of visa waiver
privileges for dual nationals of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan. See, e.g., Robert Mackey, BBC
Journalist Turned Away from Flight to U.S. Because She Was Born in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2016.
16. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE BY U.S. CITIZENS AND U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS RESIDING
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED ISSUES 1 (May 1998), https://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Documents/tax598.pdf (noting that income exclusions and tax
credits “allow[ed] many U.S. citizens or resident aliens who reside abroad to reduce or
eliminate their U.S. tax liability”).
17. In 2015, U.S. citizens residing in foreign countries could exclude up to $100,800 in
foreign earned income from U.S. income tax computations. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR U.S. CITIZENS AND RESIDENT ALIENS ABROAD (2015), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p54.pdf. The United States has entered into tax treaties with several
dozen foreign countries to further reduce the risk of double taxation.
18. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, § 353, 115 Stat. 272, 322 (2001); Report of Foreign
Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) IRS (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/report-of-foreign-bank-and-financial-accounts-fbar.
19. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the
Battle Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 512 (2012).
Winter 2017] Citizenship Overreach 171
more heavily on the external population insofar as they will typically hold
accounts in their foreign place of residence. The FBAR/FATCA regime
imposed significant accounting costs even on those of relatively modest
means.20 Penalties for non-compliance are steep.21 FATCA also imposed
reporting requirements on foreign financial institutions (FFIs) with U.S.
account holders. Faced with the administrative expense of complex
FATCA controls, many foreign banks have turned away U.S. customers.22
These FFIs have become adept at identifying U.S. citizens among existing
and prospective retail customers, and FATCA has become a dirty word
among U.S. citizens abroad.23 It is especially reviled among those whose
connection to the United States is tenuous.
This Article examines international law limitations on the ascription
of citizenship and national self-definition. The United States is
exceptionally generous in its extension of citizenship. Alone among the
major developed states, it extends citizenship to almost all persons in its
territory at the moment of birth.24 This birthright citizenship is
20. See, e.g., AMANDA KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, MIGRANTS OR EXPATRIATES?
AMERICANS IN EUROPE 262 (2014) (noting that Americans who may not have any tax
liability nonetheless require accounting assistance for the filing of complicated tax forms);
Rosie Spinks, Double Trouble: The Pain of Dual Citizen Expat Taxes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29,
2016 (describing the lamentation of a U.S. citizen overseas regarding the fact that she had
spent more on accountant fees than she owed in taxes); Taxation, AM. CITIZENS ABROAD,
https://www.americansabroad.org/taxation (“Tax filing from abroad is significantly more
costly than domestic tax filing, even when no tax is due.”).
21. See, e.g., James Fallows, The Fatca Menace!, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 2, 2012 (reporting
one example in which unintentional reporting error led to large penalty); Jeanne Sahadi,
You’ve Never Seen IRS Penalties Like These, CNN MONEY, June 4, 2015; TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 239-41 (2013) (describing the
“potentially punitive” nature of tax and listing FATCA as among the “most serious
problems” requiring policy revision).
22. See, e.g., DEMOCRATS ABROAD, FATCA: AFFECTING EVERYDAY AMERICANS
EVERY DAY (Sept. 2014), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Att%202%20
Democrats%20Abroad%202014%20FATCA%20Research%20Report1.pdf (reporting that
one in six U.S. citizens abroad faced bank account closure in FATCA’s wake); Siri Srinivas, ‘I
Was Terrified We’d Lose All Our Money’: Banks Tell US Customers They Won’t Work with
Americans, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2014; Sophia Yan, Banks Lock Out Americans over
New Tax Law, CNN MONEY, Sept. 15, 2013.
23. See, e.g., Gandal, supra note 2; Stu Haugen, An American Tax Nightmare, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2015.
24. See, e.g., Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five
Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 20
(Alexander T. Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2010); see also European Union
Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, Comparing Citizenship Laws: Acquisition of
Citizenship, EUROPEAN UNIV. INST. (2015) [hereinafter EUDO Database], http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition (providing a searchable database of citizenship
laws). Although the jus soli approach is unusual among OECD states, it is typical of Western
Hemisphere states. See OLIVIER VONK, NATIONALITY LAW IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE:
A STUDY ON GROUNDS FOR ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE AMERICAS AND
THE CARIBBEAN 10-11 (2014) (noting that thirty out of thirty-five Western Hemisphere states
have automatic jus soli acquisition at birth).
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constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.25 At the
same time that it is generous at the front end, U.S. citizenship is sticky at
the back. Termination of citizenship on the individual’s part can involve
substantial fees.26 Expatriation is contingent on tax compliance and, in
some cases, will implicate the recognition of capital gains.27
In other words, it is possible to get stuck in a citizenship one never
wanted in the first place. The FATCA experience supplies an unusually
fertile case for exploring this under-systematized quadrant at the
intersection of citizenship and international law. In light of the continuing
obligations of U.S. citizenship, is it possible that the U.S. birthright
citizenship and expatriation regimes violate international norms?28
They may. Even in the context of extremely relaxed historical
constraints on state nationality practice, there were acknowledged
nineteenth century limitations on the extension of citizenship to
individuals with insufficient connection to a state—citizenship over-
claiming, as it were.29 Naturalization has been understood to have a
volitional predicate, that is, citizenship acquired after birth cannot be
forced on an individual against her will. Citizenship on the basis of
territorial birth has always been accepted as a legitimate basis for
extending citizenship even though it involves no choice on the part of the
individual to whom citizenship is ascribed. That may reflect notions of the
common law relating to nationality, and the assumption that most people
lived out their lives in the countries in which they were born. That no
longer comports with a world in which mobility has reached
unprecedented levels. There is a greater probability than ever before that
a person’s birthplace will not coincide with the place in which she makes
her life. The same can be said of citizenship by descent, through which
citizenship can pass automatically on the basis of tenuous social
membership ties. The mismatch between citizenship and actual community
draws birthright citizenship into question, at least where citizenship
obligations follow an individual regardless of place of residence.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the state wherein
they reside.”).
26. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
27. There are substantial barriers to expatriation. See infra notes 100-03 and
accompanying text.
28. Audrey Macklin explores an analogous situation in which citizenship attribution is
problematic from an individual rights perspective. Audrey Macklin, Sticky Citizenship, in
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY CONCEPT 223 (Rhoda E. Howard
Hassmann & Margaret Walton-Roberts eds., 2015). Individuals have been denied refugee
status where they have the right to citizenship in a third country. North Koreans have been
denied refugee status in Canada, for example, because they are entitled to citizenship in
South Korea. Id. at 230. This difficulty is distinguishable from the U.S. case insofar as the
citizenship is being imputed by another state, not imposed by the state whose citizenship is at
issue.
29. See infra notes 31 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this article sketches international law as it has constrained
state citizenship practice. Historically, the only limits on state nationality
practices involved over-claiming. Those constraints arose in an era in
which nationality implicated thick obligations. It was understood that
nationality could not be imposed in the absence of connections between
individual and state. Volition was a necessary predicate to naturalization; a
state could not extend nationality after birth against an individual’s will.
Practice also established that one state could not diplomatically protect a
putative national against another state in the absence of genuine links to
the individual. Expatriation, meanwhile, was vigorously contested in the
face of nineteenth century migrations to the United States. The history
suggests at least a provisional individual right to expatriate.
Part II applies these background norms to current U.S. practice.
Absolute birthright citizenship and automatic jus sanguinis citizenship may
now be problematic from a rights perspective to the extent the regime
allocates citizenship to individuals with no social attachment to the United
States, associates substantial obligations with external citizenship, and
maintains high barriers to expatriation.
To the extent U.S. citizenship practice does compromise individual
rights, there are tax fixes and there are citizenship fixes. Part III sets out
possible changes to the citizenship regime that could improve the
conformity of citizenship and community. Citizenship fixes include opt-in
and opt-out mechanisms for birthright citizenship. The better solution may
lie in frictionless exit for those with nominal ties to the national
community. Though reform is more likely to be accomplished through the
tax regime, the moment highlights the over-inclusiveness of U.S.
citizenship, which may undermine its utility as a platform for
redistribution.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW: A RIGHT NOT TO HAVE CITIZENSHIP?
The allocation of nationality has long been considered a matter of
near-complete sovereign discretion. It is only recently that the denial of
citizenship has even been contested under international law. Such chal-
lenges are gaining momentum as part of a unified human rights strategy in
which citizenship supplies a vehicle to formal legal equality.30 Under the
current conventional wisdom, meanwhile, the granting of citizenship can-
not be too generous. That is largely because there are few downsides to
being a citizen. In most contexts, citizenship implicates few, if any, contin-
gent obligations. To the extent that citizenship poses benefits but no costs,
it is unsurprising that the conferral of citizenship has triggered little scru-
tiny under international law.
That was not always the case. The obligations of nationality, for males
at least, historically included military service obligations and robust norms
of allegiance. Holding nationality in a state also barred claims against that
30. See Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, supra note 5, at 719-20.
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state in international fora.31 In a context in which one had material rea-
sons not to hold nationality, the aggressive extension of nationality was
sometimes contested.32 The U.S. tax regime in that respect has a back-to-
the-future quality. The coupling of expansive birthright citizenship and
consequential citizenship obligations sets the stage for interrogating the
conferral of citizenship.
This is not to say that the issue was ever very high-profile. Nationality
practice was historically insulated from international law, so much so that
early theorists of the law of nations barely touched the subject.33 That
reflected the largely sedentary nature of human life. As migration to the
New World accelerated through the nineteenth century, nationality issues
provoked disputes among states. By far the most important flashpoint re-
lated not to the extension of nationality but to the refusal to allow its ter-
mination against assertions of a right to expatriation (a history I will
recount below).34 With respect to the allocation of nationality, two norms
emerged from decentralized international legal process, decoded from dis-
putes between states and their resolution, formal or not. First, naturaliza-
tion of an individual was contingent on individual consent. Second, for
international law purposes at least, a state could not lay claim to an indi-
vidual in the absence of a “genuine link” between the individual and the
state.
A. Constraining Citizenship Allocations
The first norm was provoked by the former practice of some Latin
American states to extend naturalization by operation of law. Peru, Mex-
ico, and Argentina at points purported to confer nationality automatically
on foreigners after a period of residence. Under an 1886 Mexican national-
ity law, all aliens acquiring real estate in Mexico would automatically be-
come Mexican nationals in the absence of a declaration of retention of
original nationality.35 In 1889, Brazil decreed all resident foreigners would
become nationals unless they made a declaration to the contrary within six
months of the decree.36 European states and the United States protested
these measures, primarily concerned with the effect of naturalization on
their capacity to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of their nationals
31. See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD 588 (1925) (“[A] person cannot sue his own government in an international
court . . .”).
32. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., ALFRED M. BOLL, MULTIPLE NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
183 (2007)
34. See infra Part IB.
35. See Maximilian Koessler, Subject, Citizen, National, and Permanent Allegiance, 56
YALE L.J. 58, 75 n.100 (1946).
36. Brazilian Decree Regulating the Naturalization of Foreigners Residing in the Re-
public, reprinted in 81 BRIT. AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 233 (1889).
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in the state of residence.37 To the extent that the naturalizations were rec-
ognized as valid, home states would lose the capacity under international
law to intervene on behalf of their nationals under the rule that one state
could not espouse claims against another state in which a person also held
nationality.38 Naturalization might also have resulted in loss of home state
nationality under home state law – that is, effect a change of nationality.39
This was important to European states and the United States, which often
found themselves pressing claims against Latin American states relating to
expropriations and other property harms.40
As recounted by mid-century nationality law scholar Paul Weis, arbi-
tral commissions rejected the effect of the automatic naturalization re-
gimes where Latin American states asserted nationality as a defense to
claims. Weis concluded that the practice established that “the acquisition
of a new nationality must contain an element of voluntariness on the part
of the individual acquiring it, that it must not be conferred against the will
of the individual.”41 Likewise, the Harvard Research in International Law
observed in 1929 that “the general principle that no state is free to acquire
the allegiance of natural persons without their consent is believed to be
generally recognized.”42 It continued:
If State A should attempt . . . to naturalize persons who have
never had any connection with State A, who have never been
within its territory, who have never acted in its territory, who have
no relation whatever to any persons who have been its nationals,
and who are nationals of other states, it would seem that State A
would clearly have gone beyond the limits set by international
law.43
37. See, e.g., Summary of a Letter from Mr. Blaine, U.S. Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams,
U.S. Minister to Brazil, (Feb. 19, 1890), in 3 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307, 308
(John Bassett Moore ed., 1906) (noting that, in response to Brazilian law, the U.S. Secretary
of State asserted that “[t]o hold that the mere residence of an individual in a foreign country
was conclusive evidence of his desire and intention to become one of its citizens would . . .
involve an assumption of a most violent character”).
38. See, e.g., BORCHARD, supra note 31, at 588.
39. See, e.g., Letter from Mr. Bayard, U.S. Sec. of State, to Mr. Suzzara-Verdi (Jan. 27,
1887), in A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 714 (noting that the Depart-
ment of State “frequently declared” that when a citizen of the United States naturalized in
another country he was “regarded as having lost his rights as a citizen of the United States”).
40. See BORCHARD, supra note 31, ch. 7.
41. See PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 110
(2d ed. 1979); see also H.F. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN OUTLINE 156 (1959) (“[I]t would be hard to defend that the conferment of national-
ity on a person who has no connection whatsoever with the State in question may ever pro-
duce nationality within the meaning of international law.”).
42. Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, The Law of National-
ity, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 26 (Special Supp. 1929) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
43. Id.; see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Nationality, Including Statelessness, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/50/1952, at 8 (1952) [hereinafter Rep. on Nationality] (concluding that
“[n]aturalization must be based on an explicit voluntary act of the individual or of a person
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The Harvard group’s draft treaty on nationality law provided that “a state
may not naturalize a person of full age who is a national of another state
without the consent of such person.”44 Some Latin American states per-
sisted in attempting to impose automatic naturalization schemes through
the mid-twentieth century; Mexico’s law, for example, was only repealed
in 1934 and, as late as 1949, Argentina considered enacting a law under
which all foreigners resident for longer than two years could avoid natural-
ization only by leaving the country.45
The consent could be tacit, a necessary condition to validating prevail-
ing approaches to the naturalization of minors as well as women. Under
nineteenth century practice, in most cases women automatically acquired
the nationality of foreign husbands upon marriage.46 In that context, the
voluntariness of the marriage was taken as a stand-in for consent to natu-
ralization that followed from it.47 Children could also be naturalized with-
out their consent upon the naturalization of a parent.48 Otherwise,
however, non-consensual naturalization was understood to be barred by
customary international law.49
The “genuine link” norm arose where a state sought to press an inter-
national claim of an individual with whom it had no real connection. It was
most famously articulated in the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ)
1954 decision in the Nottebohm case, in which Liechtenstein asserted a
claim on behalf of a German-born naturalized citizen against Guatemala,
acting on his behalf”). Brownlie has noted that the “element of deliberate association of
individual and State is surely important.” Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality in Public
International Law, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 284, 310 (1963).
44. See also Lester Orfield, Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427,
441 (1949) (“[N]o state may confer its nationality upon nationals of another state unless the
individual himself asks for such a change of his status.”).
45. See Koessler, supra note 35, at 75 n.100; Virginia Lee Warren, Forced Citizenship Is
Urged by Peron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1949.
46. See, e.g., BORCHARD, supra note 31, at 593-94; League of Nations Committee of
Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, Nationality, 20 AM. J. INT’L L.
21, 38 (Special Supp. 1926).
47. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915); see also CANDICE LEWIS
BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW OF CITI-
ZENSHIP 64-67 (1998); Leonard Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1510, 1516 (1960).
48. See Harvard Research, supra note 42, art. 15 (“[A] state may naturalize a person
not of full age, in connection with its naturalization of his parent, without the consent of such
person.”). Children continue to be subject in most countries to derivative naturalization
mechanisms under which they have no say in following a parent’s acquisition of citizenship.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000) (providing for the automatic citizenship of a child of a natu-
ralized citizen).
49. See Koessler, supra note 35, at 74 (“A general exception to the rule of domestic
domain in matters of nationality law is represented by the prohibition of compulsory natural-
ization, which, according to textual authority, forms part of the prevailing customary interna-
tional law.”); Myres S. McDougal et al., Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the
Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE. L.J. 900, 920 (1974) (“To impose naturalization upon
individual persons against their will . . . is incompatible with the commonly accepted princi-
ples of international law.”).
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which had refused to recognize the naturalization and expropriated his
property as an enemy alien.50 The ICJ denied Liechtenstein’s capacity to
assert the claim in the absence of pre-existing connections between Not-
tebohm and the country. “[N]ationality is a legal bond having as its basis a
social fact of attachment,” the Court observed, finding that it is “a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the exis-
tence of reciprocal rights and duties.”51 The Court was careful to confine
the ruling to the international non-effect of the naturalization, refusing to
interfere with Nottebohm’s status as a citizen for purposes of municipal
law so long as it did not infringe on the rights of other states.52 But the
decision nonetheless vaunted the social aspects of nationality, conceiving it
as something more than a formal classification.
Neither of these two norms—the requirements of consent and genuine
link—touched on birthright citizenship practices. The two dominant mod-
els for ascribing citizenship at birth—on the basis of parentage (jus
sanguinis) or territorial birth (jus soli)—have both been accepted as legiti-
mate criteria for the conferral of citizenship.53 Neither is contingent on
individual consent.54 Only at the margins have they been challenged.
States and commentators have asserted limits to the number of genera-
tions that jus sanguinis can descend in the absence of individual consent.55
Thus, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini’s boast that “once an Italian, al-
ways an Italian, to the seventh generation” was met with derision.56 Leav-
ing aside its application where a parent has expatriated prior to the child’s
birth, almost all states extend citizenship to the children of citizens born
50. The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 6).
51. Id. at 23-24.
52. Id. at 20; see also Josef L. Kunz, The Nottebohm Judgment (Second Phase), 54 AM.
J. INT’L L. 536, 550 (1960).
53. See, e.g., WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (2d.
ed. 1884) (“[W]here a difference of legal theory can exist international law has made no
choice, and it is left open to states to act as they like.”); see also VAN PANHUYS, supra note 41,
at 160-61; Rep. on Nationality, supra note 43, at 7 (“[U]niformity of nationality laws seems to
indicate a consensus of opinion of States that conferment of nationality at birth has to be
based on either, on jus soli or on jus sanguinis, or on a combination of these principles.”).
54. See, e.g., McDougal et al., supra note 49, at 919 (“[T]hese two principles for confer-
ment of nationality at birth disregard human volition. The individual selects neither his par-
ents nor his place of birth.”).
55. See, e.g., Harvard Research, supra note 42, art. 4; Herbert Hugh Naujoks, Power of
the National State in International Law to Determine the Nationality of an Individual, 6 TEMP.
L.Q. 451, 466 (1931) (applauding the fact that most countries did not allow citizenship by
descent beyond the second generation and noting that “[i]t is not desirable that the national-
ity of a particular state should be acquired by unlimited generations of persons born in the
territory of another state and bearing the nationality of the latter under its law”). These calls
continue today. See, e.g., Rainer Baubo¨ck, Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Politi-
cal Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393,
2426 (2007).
56. See John H. Wigmore, Domicile, Double Allegiance, and World Citizenship, 21 U.
ILL. L. REV. 761, 764 (1927).
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abroad. Extending citizenship on this basis is uncontested.57 Jus soli is per-
missively available, limited by international law only with respect to the
children of accredited diplomats and populations under hostile occupa-
tion.58 As with constraints on naturalization, these objections were con-
ceived as infringements on the rights of other states, not the rights of
individuals, and as exceptions that proved the rule of state discretion. Oth-
erwise, the ascription of nationality on the basis of territorial birth has
gone unchallenged from an international law perspective.59
Broad acceptance of jus sanguinis and jus soli can be explained in doc-
trinal terms as part of the general principles of international law, prevail-
ing approaches to birth citizenship that date to the dawn of modern
nationality and before.60 Both can also be processed through the “genuine
link” optic.61 Historically it will have been the case that place of birth, in
the vast majority of cases, would have coincided with a life trajectory of
social attachment. Jus soli derives from feudal understandings of puta-
tively natural social hierarchies in which movement was highly re-
stricted.62 Parentage would also have evidenced continuing social
connections to a home state, at least in the absence of naturalization in
another. (If, for example, Nottebohm had been born in Liechtenstein or
born elsewhere to Liechtenstein nationals, Liechtenstein’s right to espouse
57. See Weil, supra note 24, at 20 (listing the birth citizenship regimes of 25 states, all
of which include some element of jus sanguinis). Controversy persists with respect to the
practice of some states to discriminate on the basis of gender with respect to jus sanguinis
rules, once almost universally the case. Discrimination on the basis of sex in nationality prac-
tices is internationally prohibited. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women art. 9, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Nonetheless, a number of
parties to the convention have reserved from this obligation and persist in nationality prac-
tices that discriminate on the basis of sex. See INT’L LAW ASS’N COMM. ON FEMINISM AND
INT’L LAW, FINAL REPORT ON WOMEN’S EQUALITY AND NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 39-40 (2000).
58. See Brownlie, supra note 43, at 304-05. On the former, see the Hague Convention
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 12, Apr. 13, 1930, 179
League of Nations Treaty Series 89. U.S. law conforms to the exception for the children of
diplomats born on U.S. territory, which is understood to be the sole surviving exception to
birthright citizenship.
59. Of course, this has come under political attack. See, e.g., Anand Giridharadas, The
Attack on Birthright Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2015. Important political theorists have
also questioned the ascriptive aspect of birthright citizenship. See generally PETER SCHUCK &
ROGERS SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POL-
ICY (1985); AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INE-
QUALITY (2009).
60. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 43, at 314. Recognized as a source of international
law by the statute of the International Court of Justice, general principles are distinguishable
from customary international law insofar as they can be established even in the absence of
opinio juris—evidence that states are acting out of a sense of legal obligation.
61. Cf. Kunz, supra note 52, at 546 (noting that both jus soli and jus sanguinis involve
“some connection” to granting states and stating that “[i]n this sense, we may speak of a wide
‘link’ necessity, as pertaining to the international law actually in force”).
62. See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 59, at 13-17; Polly J. Price, Natural Law and
Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 73, 78 (1997).
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the claim after his naturalization would have been considerably stronger.)
Those sociological facts obviated any need to introduce a consent element
to birthright citizenship. In most cases, there would have been an implied
or inchoate consent that would have been realized, with place of birth or
lineage serving as a proxy for future social membership.
B. Letting Citizens Go
If birthright citizenship was only marginally constrained by interna-
tional law, a right of exit was more vigorously asserted. In framing a right
not to have a particular nationality, expatriation supplies the primary his-
torical terrain. Because expatriation once implicated the clash of state in-
terests, its terms have been better developed. To the extent expatriation is
a right, it overtakes discretion regarding conferral of nationality. If citizen-
ship can be shed on a frictionless basis, it mitigates concerns relating to its
allocation.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, expatriation trig-
gered mammoth disputes between the United States and European sover-
eigns. The typical case involved a person born a subject of a European
monarch who emigrated to the United States and naturalized there. Many
European states refused to recognize the legitimacy of naturalization
under the doctrine of perpetual allegiance (“once a subject, always a sub-
ject”).63 Conflict resulted when naturalized Americans returned to visit
their homelands only to find themselves pressed into military service. U.S.
diplomatic digests from the late nineteenth century are littered with cases
in which the United States protested—sometimes at great diplomatic
cost—the refusal of other states to recognize the transfer of allegiance.64
The “right of expatriation” became a domestic political rallying cry. Trig-
gered by a British treason trial in which the Crown refused to recognize
the U.S. naturalization of a subject and denied him procedural privileges
extended to foreigners,65 an 1868 statute pronounced expatriation to be “a
natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of
the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”66
In the face of this unsurprisingly persistent U.S. pressure, many impor-
tant European sovereigns relented, terminating citizenship upon naturali-
63. See Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J.
1411, 1420-24 (1997).
64. For examples, see PETER J. SPIRO, AT HOME IN TWO COUNTRIES: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP 11-38 (2016) [hereinafter SPIRO, AT HOME IN TWO
COUNTRIES].
65. See DAVID SIM, A UNION FOREVER: THE IRISH QUESTION AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY IN THE VICTORIAN AGE 111-12 (2013) (describing the trial of John Warren, a case
that provoked a political furor in the United States); see also Summary of a Letter from Mr.
Seward, U.S. Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, U.S. Minister to England, (Jan. 13, 1868), in A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 580 (describing outrage “throughout the
whole country, from Portland to San Francisco and from St. Paul to Pensacola”).
66. Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223. See also the Burlingame Treaty between the
United States and China, which recognized the “inherent and inalienable right of man to
change his home and allegiance.” Burlingame-Seward Treaty art. 5, China-U.S., July 28, 1868.
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zation in another country. The United Kingdom adopted this approach on
a retroactive basis in 1870.67 Some states, such as France, continue to
make expatriation contingent on the satisfaction of military service re-
quirements, even for those born with nationality abroad.68 Individuals
clearly had an interest in expatriation, hence its framing as a right; where
denied the capacity to transfer nationality, migrating individuals were
caught in the equivalent of turf battles between states as each lay claim to
the individual as a potential solider.69 Although expatriation gained trac-
tion under the rights banner, it was more like a duty. Naturalization re-
quired a complete transfer of affiliation.70 Dual citizenship was considered
an abomination.71 To the extent that expatriation was a right, it was a right
of states to claim complete dominion over their newly-minted members.72
That was consistent with an international legal backdrop recognizing
few individual rights. As human rights gained traction after World War II,
the individual right to expatriation was among them. Article 15 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights provided that “[n]o one shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.”73 The provision was not duplicated in binding follow-up in-
struments; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
other major human rights instruments include a right to leave a country,
not shed its nationality.74
67. See SPIRO, AT HOME IN TWO COUNTRIES, supra note 64, at 18-19; Harvard Re-
search, supra note 42, at 48.
68. See, e.g., SPIRO, AT HOME IN TWO COUNTRIES, supra note 64, at 22-23 (providing
examples of the application of this regime).
69. See, e.g., Aristide Zolberg, The Exit Revolution, in CITIZENSHIP AND THOSE WHO
LEAVE 34 (Nancy L. Green & Francois Weil eds., 2007) (describing state anxiety over losing
military manpower in allowing expatriation).
70. See, e.g., Letter from Mr. Cass, U.S. Sec. of State, to Mr. Wright, U.S. Minister to
Prussia (July 8, 1859), in A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 574 (noting
that naturalization constitutes a “new political birth”).
71. See, e.g., Letter from Mr. Bancroft, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of the United States, to Lord Palmerston, Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Great
Britain (Jan. 26, 1849), in 53 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 639, 643 (1868) (asserting
that states should “as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two countries; as
soon bear with polygamy as that state of double allegiance which common sense so repudi-
ates that it has not even coined a word to express it”).
72. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 43, at 343 (“[I]t is not the case, in light of existing
practice, that the individual has such a right [to expatriation].”).
73. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15 (Dec. 10,
1948); see also Jane McAdam, An Intellectual History of Freedom of Movement in Interna-
tional Law: The Right to Leave as a Personal Liberty, 12 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 27, 28 (2011)
(discussing the lead-up to the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own”); American
Convention on Human Rights art. 5(d)(II), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(2), Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. See generally HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1987).
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Nonetheless, a norm against arbitrary bars on expatriation is reflected
in contemporary state practice. The 1997 European Convention on Na-
tionality obligates states to permit renunciation by those habitually resi-
dent abroad.75 The right to leave is clearly better established (a flashpoint
of the Cold War era76), but, as Dimitry Kochenov observes, “the rights to
travel abroad and to expatriate are very difficult to differentiate in prac-
tice.”77 Weis concluded that under international law, states “should not
withhold discharge from its nationality” for individuals who reside abroad
where the discharge would not result in the failure to perform specific
obligations to the state, including military service obligations.78 McDou-
gal, Lasswell, and Chen asserted a right to change nationality given the
non-volitional nature of birth citizenship. “The fact that a person possesses
a particular nationality at birth, or after birth, should not condemn him in
perpetuity to membership in a body politic which may be perceived by him
to be more oppressive than protective.”79 As with international law’s vali-
dation of birthright citizenship through territorial birth and parentage, vin-
dicating a right to expatriation also fits into a “genuine links” logic. In the
conventional historical case where an individual migrated permanently
from his country of origin, the homeland tie would be deactivated.80
To the extent that an individual right of expatriation remains provi-
sional, it may be because there has been little need to put it to work under
contemporary conditions. During the mid-twentieth century, state practice
facilitated rather than obstructed expatriation, as many states (including
the United States) automatically terminated the nationality of individuals
who naturalized in another state or who actively maintained another na-
tionality acquired at birth.81 That practice has more recently dissipated as
states come to accept dual citizenship. For many, including the United
States, the default position now assumes retention of nationality upon the
acquisition or retention of other nationalities.82 A contemporary right of
75. European Convention on Nationality art. 8, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. 166.
76. To the extent that citizenship has been coupled with the right to leave, it has been
by way of a right to retain citizenship rather than to shed it. See HANNUM, supra note 74, at
101-02 (describing the Soviet practice under which individuals would have to renounce citi-
zenship as a condition to the issuance of exit visa).
77. Dimitry Kochenov, The Right to Leave Any Country Including Your Own in Inter-
national Law, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 43, 56 (2012).
78. WEIS, supra note 41, at 133.
79. McDougal et al., supra note 49, at 928-29. The authors also note that “the right to
change a nationality is increasingly regarded as a fundamental human right.” Id.
80. See Brownlie, supra note 43, at 343-44 (applying a principle of effective link to
support state duty to recognize right to expatriation).
81. See Harvard Research, supra note 42, at 39 (noting the “modern tendency” to-
wards “general recognition” of a right of expatriation).
82. See State Department Cable to U.S. Embassies in London, Seoul, Islamabad, Gua-
temala, and Nairobi (Feb. 10, 1995) in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1618 (1995) (“It is no
longer possible to terminate an American’s citizenship without the citizen’s cooperation.”).
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expatriation remains largely untested.83 This may be in part because most
states set a low bar to renunciation. More evidently, there is not much
reason to terminate citizenship as citizenship “lightens,” in Christian
Joppke’s formulation.84 In contrast to the nineteenth century, in which the
denial of expatriation could result in severe duplicative obligations attend-
ant to nationality, there is now little downside to retaining multiple citizen-
ships in most cases. Obligations distinctive to citizenship are minimal even
for territorial residents.85 For those resident abroad, the obligations are,
for most countries, non-existent; the costs of retaining citizenship are ef-
fectively zero. At the same time, there are typically some benefits attached
to the status.86 The lack of an incentive to expatriate goes a long way to
explaining the spotty evidence for the right.
II. U.S. CITIZENSHIP: TOO EASY TO GET, TOO HARD TO SHED
Is U.S. citizenship practice too cloying against this backdrop? Any
conclusions are necessarily suggestive and provisional because the practice
is so thin. There appear to be no contemporary episodes in which citizen-
ship practice has been challenged for being overly generous. But the U.S.
citizenship regime appears at least in tension with historical norms as they
map out onto the contemporary global context. The allocation of citizen-
ship in the absence of a genuine link without the possibility of frictionless
exit, at least as coupled with nontrivial attendant obligations, may infringe
individual rights under international law.
Citizenship practice clearly could violate individual rights in theory. If,
as the Harvard Research observed almost a century ago, the United States
83. At the time of the exit tax legislation, there appears to have been a consensus that
it conformed to international law. It does not appear that this analysis considered the applica-
tion to happenstance Americans, however. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ISSUES
PRESENTED BY PROPOSALS TO MODIFY THE TAX TREATMENT OF EXPATRIATION 99-100
(Comm. Print 1995) (concluding that the exit tax conformed with international law, while
conceding the “lack of clearly defined, objective standard” and the “inevitab[ility] that de-
bate will continue”); Detlev Vagts, The Proposed Expatriation Tax – A Human Rights Viola-
tion?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 578, 580 (1995) (supposing a “rational connection to the relation
between the emigrant and the state”).
84. See generally Christian Joppke, The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship, 51 EUR. J.
SOC. 9 (2010).
85. See Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship, supra note 10, at
913-15 (describing jury duty as the only distinctive obligation of citizenship).
86. These benefits will always include absolute entry rights to the country of citizen-
ship and will often include full political rights, even as an external citizen. See, e.g., Jean-
Michel Lafleur, The Enfranchisement of Citizens Abroad in a Comparative Perspective, 22
DEMOCRATIZATION 840 (2015). Citizenship may implicate economic rights in that country to
the extent that a state constrains ownership and commercial activity by noncitizens. Citizen-
ship in a state may also implicate travel and settlement rights in other countries. Thus, citi-
zenship in an EU member state brings with it the right of free movement in other EU
member states. That explains, for example, the large numbers of Latin Americans who have
claimed citizenship on the basis of ancestry in Italy and Spain. See DAVID COOK-MARTI´N,
THE SCRAMBLE FOR CITIZENS: DUAL NATIONALITY AND STATE COMPETITION FOR IMMI-
GRANTS (2013).
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imposed nationality on all residents within 500 miles of the border (or, to
make it more tax-rich, those living in London’s SW1), the practice would
violate international law.87 That would be true whether the status was im-
posed after or at birth; the timing would be inconsequential. The status
would be allocated in the absence of either consent or a connection suffi-
cient to justify the imposition, especially insofar as the status implicated
costs to the nonconsenting holder. In the traditional framing, the action
would comprise a violation of another state’s sovereignty. Sovereignty in-
terests might still be implicated today, but individual rights would also
clearly enter into the mix.
U.S. citizenship practice triggers some concern against the baseline.
With respect to jus soli citizenship, an individual garners U.S. citizenship
on the basis of birth within the territory of the United States notwithstand-
ing the lack of any connection at birth or after.88 Perhaps this is not a
problem of consent, as the mother will be in the United States on a volun-
tary basis in almost all cases (though of course the child will not have
consented to the presence). The question then reduces to whether place of
birth constitutes a “genuine link” (in the vocabulary of Nottebohm) in the
absence of any other connection, or whether it ascribes citizenship in an
arbitrary fashion.
Arguably, it is arbitrary. Where an individual has no distinctive social,
economic, or cultural ties to the United States other than place of birth, it
is hard to denominate the person as an “American” as anything but a mat-
ter of form. An extreme example would be the phenomenon of “border
babies” born to Canadian mothers on the U.S. side of the border, where
high-risk pregnancies enjoy better treatment options.89 But the argument
would apply to Boris Johnson and the many individuals who were born in
the United States only to leave in infancy. These are not people who have
a “voluntary social connection” to the United States in any meaningful
sense.90
The same argument can be made with respect to jus sanguinis citizen-
ship in some cases. The cultural ties to the United States are more proba-
ble under statutory terms—in so-called mixed marriages, citizenship only
descends where the citizen parent was physically present in the United
States for five years, at least two of which were after the parent turned
fourteen91—but one can pose many common scenarios in which the pa-
rental link (either to the United States or to the child) will be thin and the
87. Harvard Research, supra note 42, at 26 (“[I]f State A should attempt to naturalize
all persons living outside its territory but within 500 miles of its frontier, it clearly would have
passed” the limitations on the power of a state to confer nationality).
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[A]ll persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”); see also
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 256 (1980) (noting that the government cannot terminate
U.S. citizenship acquired at birth except where a citizen intends to relinquish it).
89. See Border Babies v. the IRS, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2016.
90. Kirsch, supra note 4, at 14.
91. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994).
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person will hardly qualify as American within even the broader concep-
tions of the identity. For example, the child of an American father and
non-citizen mother will have citizenship for life even if the parents divorce
when the child is young and the child has no continuing relationship with
the father. With citizenship jus sanguinis, it is possible to be a U.S. citizen
without ever setting foot in the United States.92
The ascription of citizenship in these cases of nominal membership
would be of lesser consequence if no obligations attached to the status.
Outside the tax regime, the obligations of U.S. citizenship are sufficiently
minimal so as not to trigger rights concerns.93 But the burdens of the tax
regime are hardly minimal. U.S. law requires all citizens with income over
minimal levels to file income tax returns regardless of country of resi-
dence.94 Tax liabilities may be minimal in many cases as a result of the
foreign earned income exemption95 and foreign tax credits.96 Bilateral tax
treaties may further reduce the tax burden of Americans abroad. U.S. tax
liabilities may nonetheless be substantial, especially with respect to high
earners. Regardless of the tax liability, filing requirements impose prepa-
ration costs. Add to the 1040 requirement the recently adopted FBAR and
FATCA filing requirements and the burden of U.S. citizenship for those
living abroad clearly qualifies as non-trivial.97 There are no carve-outs
from these filing requirements and tax liabilities for happenstance Ameri-
cans. The tax obligation may render citizenship “more oppressive than
protective,” in McDougal’s articulation.98
92. If a parent satisfies the residency requirement, the child’s citizenship is not condi-
tional on the child’s subsequent residency, which had been the case until 1978. See, e.g., Rog-
ers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (upholding the requirement that a child be physically
present for five years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight to retain citizenship
through descent).
93. Qualifying U.S. citizens who are resident abroad are obligated to register with the
Selective Service and would, in theory, be subject to conscription, but this is a trivial obliga-
tion given the improbability of a revived draft. U.S. citizens are required to use a U.S. pass-
port when presenting themselves for inspection and admission into the United States. 22
C.F.R. § 53.1 (2007). U.S. persons are subject to criminal liability for certain crimes regard-
less of where they are committed; examples are the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and sex
tourism crimes. This kind of “nationality jurisdiction” is well-established under international
law. See, e.g., Harvard Research, supra note 42, at 519 (characterizing nationality jurisdiction
as “universally conceded”). U.S. citizenship does provide some benefits to citizens abroad,
namely diplomatic protection and consular assistance, though these prerogatives have de-
clined in an era in which rights are located more in personhood than nationality.
94. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1(b) (1976); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
95. 26 U.S.C. § 911 (2014).
96. 26 U.S.C. § 901 (2014).
97. See, e.g., Gandal, supra note 2. Another provisional international law argument
against the FATCA regime and onerous reporting requirements would be that they unfairly
discriminate against external citizens. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,
RECOMMENDATION 1650: LINKS BETWEEN EUROPEANS LIVING ABROAD AND THEIR COUN-
TRIES OF ORIGIN (Mar. 2, 2004), https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fileid=17195&lang=en (calling for states to take account of the interests of citizens
living abroad).
98. McDougal et al., supra note 49, at 928.
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The expatriation tax regime does exempt some citizens whose ties to
the United States may be thin. The definition of “covered expatriates”
does not include those born with dual citizenship who continue to reside in
their other state of nationality and who have not been tax resident in the
United States more than ten of the previous fifteen years, as well as those
who relinquish U.S. citizenship before attaining the age of eighteen-and-a-
half and who have not been resident in the United States for more than
ten years prior to the date of relinquishment.99 However, exemption from
the exit tax also requires five years of tax compliance,100 which means that
even nominal citizens will have had to file income tax returns (in most
cases) in order to secure the benefits of the exemption where the exit tax
would otherwise apply.
Failure to demonstrate back-tax compliance also eliminates income
and asset floors to application of the exit tax (average tax liability of
$160,000 over the past five years or $2 million net worth).101 Moreover,
persons continue to be subject to U.S. tax obligations even after relin-
quishing citizenship if they fail to file an “expatriation statement” (Form
8854) with the Internal Revenue Service.102 This, in effect, makes tax com-
pliance a predicate to expatriation, or at least a predicate to securing the
tax advantage of expatriation. Although tax compliance is not a formal
condition to relinquishment of citizenship,103 it might as well be.104
There thus appears no simple way to relinquish citizenship, even
where it is acquired in the absence of meaningful social ties and even
where a person holds few assets.105 Renunciation of citizenship also re-
quires the payment of a $2,350 fee, the world’s highest.106 Renunciation
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 877A(g)(1)(B) (2014). On some anomalous results under the ex-
ception, see Virginia Jekker, Relinqushing US Citizenship – Exception for a Dual National at
Birth, ANGLOINFO DUBAI (Oct. 1, 2016), http://blogs.angloinfo.com/us-tax/2016/10/01/relin-
quishing-us-citizenship-exception-for-a-dual-national-at-birth/. In both cases, the exemption
may apply to some whose ties to the United States are stronger. An individual born in the
United States with nominal dual jus sanguinis citizenship in another country who relocated to
the other country would appear to be exempted from the exit tax after five years of residence
in that country.
100. 26 U.S.C. § 877(a)(2) (2014).
101. Id.
102. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8854 (2016).
103. The State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual is careful to instruct consular of-
ficers not to inquire into the tax circumstances of individuals seeking to relinquish their citi-
zenship. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 1266 (2015).
104. Under the current regime, it would be possible to retain a kind of tax citizenship
after renouncing national citizenship, but this would be a highly undesirable result under
which one would shoulder the costs of citizenship yet receive none of the benefits.
105. See, e.g., Phil Hodgen, The Expatriation Chronicles of an Accidental American,
HODGEN LAW PC (2015) http://hodgen.com/the-expatriation-chronicles-of-an-accidental-
american-episode-1.
106. See Robert W. Wood, U.S. Has World’s Highest Fee to Renounce Citizenship,
FORBES, Oct. 23, 2015. The next most expensive renunciation fee is less than half of that
charged by the United States – Jamaica’s at $1,010. Id. Some commenters asserted that the
400% fee increase adopted in 2015 violated an individual right to expatriation. The Depart-
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can only be executed in person at a U.S. embassy or consulate, which can
implicate travel time and expenses.107 Renunciation requires a social se-
curity number, which many “accidental Americans” will lack, adding an-
other level of bureaucratic hassle.108 In other words, expatriation imposes
nontrivial costs in all cases. Barriers to expatriation compound the over-
reach in the allocation of citizenship.109 If expatriation were frictionless
for happenstance Americans, ascription at birth would be difficult to
frame as rights-infringing. Those seeking to shed burdens associated with
the status could simply shed the status itself. As it is, many individuals
shoulder arbitrarily-imposed costs that they cannot escape without en-
countering other significant costs.
The rights framing thus implicates both the arbitrary imposition of cit-
izenship and arbitrary barriers to its termination. To the extent that citi-
zenship is arbitrarily extended to an individual, more arbitrary are any
conditions to expatriation. In the U.S. context, ascription of citizenship in
the absence of social attachment is problematically coupled with high bar-
riers to expatriation.
III. CORRECTING CITIZENSHIP OVERREACH
I do not want to exaggerate the strength of an international norms-
based challenge to U.S. citizenship practice as coupled with the tax regime
applying to non-resident Americans. The easier solution would be to elim-
inate, or at least ameliorate, citizenship-based income tax and broaden ex-
ceptions to the exit tax for those whose life connection to the United
States has never been substantial. The Obama administration proposed a
one-time exemption from the exit tax for those born with dual citizenship
if they have not resided in the United States since attaining the age of
eighteen-and-a-half. Eligibility would have been conditioned on tax com-
pliance during the prior five years as applicable to non-resident aliens,
which in many cases would require no filings of any description.110 Other
ment of State rejected these arguments on the grounds that the fee was calculated to cover
the cost of servicing the renunciation. See Schedule of Fees for Consular Services, 22 C.F.R.
§ 22 (2015).
107. See Renunciation of Nationality, 22 C.F.R. § 50.50 (1996).
108. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 1260 (2015).
109. After Ted Cruz discovered that he held Canadian citizenship on the basis of his
happenstance birth in Calgary, he was able to renounce it with a simple form and payment of
less than $100. See generally Todd J. Gillman, No, Canada: Ted Cruz Has Formally Shed His
Dual Citizenship, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 10, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/
politics/2014/06/10/no-canada-sen-ted-cruz-has-formally-shed-his-dual-citizenship. Imagine
the political uproar in the United States if the Canadian expatriation scheme mirrored the
process in the United States, including the requirement that he have procured a Canadian
social security number and then renounced his citizenship in person at the Canadian
embassy.
110. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 283 (2015). The proposal would also condi-
tion the exemption on not having held a U.S. passport except for the purpose of entering the
United States. See id. This would render ineligible those who availed themselves of the con-
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tax reforms have been floated to soften the regime as it applies to citizens
abroad.111
Citizenship practice presents an alternative channel for curbing har-
sher aspects of the regime. The tax context also supplies a high-profile
vehicle for interrogating expansive birthright citizenship, which is typically
understood (by progressives, at least) as a no-downside proposition.112
Even without the obvious burdens posed by the tax regime, the extension
of citizenship at birth may in some cases offend autonomy values.113 In
other words, even if citizenship implicated no distinctive obligations, its
imposition could be problematic in the absence of consent or genuine
links, at least where coupled with barriers to expatriation. This context
also affords an opportunity to consider how international norms might fur-
ther constrain citizenship practices.
Over-inclusive elements of U.S. citizenship practice could be cor-
rected at either the front end or the back, that is, by modifying the terms
of either birthright citizenship rules or the terms of expatriation.
Rolling back jus soli citizenship. At the front end, the absolute rule of
jus soli could be qualified to protect against overextension. As conserva-
tive opponents of birthright citizenship relentlessly highlight, the U.S. ap-
proach is unusually generous (if not quite as unusually as opponents would
make it out to be).114 Expansive territorial birth citizenship is permissive,
not mandatory; that is, international law clearly does not require it. For
purposes of better mapping citizenship onto organic community, the solu-
tion is not to make citizenship contingent on the immigration status of the
parent, or at least not absolutely so, insofar as children of unauthorized
migrants born in the United States often become authentic members of
the national community.115 Birth is less likely to evidence a life trajectory
for the children of lawful nonimmigrants, who will typically be cycling
venience of travelling on a U.S. passport even if they maintained no other connection to the
United States. It might effectively limit the exception to those who had been unaware of their
citizenship status prior to the enactment of FATCA.
111. See also Mason, supra note 4, at 231-33 (proposing that citizenship be one factor
among others in determining taxability).
112. See AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY 188 (2009) (noting “the pre-
cious property of citizenship”); see also BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER
109 (2009) (noting how theorists read citizenship “according to the genre conventions of a
popular or modern romance, as a happy-ending love story”).
113. A recent example is posed by a scheme under which the government of the United
Arab Emirates has purchased citizenship in the Comoros Islands for the stateless Bidoon of
the UAE. The stateless persons have no connection to the Comoros of any kind. See ATOSSA
ARAXIA ABRAHAMIAN, THE COSMOPOLITES 25-39 (2015); Adam Taylor, The Controversial
Plan to Give Kuwait’s Stateless People Citizenship of a Tiny, Poor African Island, WASH.
POST, May 17, 2016.
114. See, e.g., Esther Yu-His Lee, Trump Says U.S. is Only Country ‘Stupid Enough’ to
Guarantee Birthright Citizenship, THINKPROGRESS, Aug. 22, 2015. Although no European
state has adopted unconditional territorial birthright citizenship, it is prevalent among West-
ern hemisphere states. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485
(1987) (reviewing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 59).
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through the United States on a temporary basis as students or employees.
(Many of the worst FATCA-era horror stories involve children of legal
nonimmigrants such as Boris Johnson.)
U.K. practice points to a fix. Britain’s absolute approach to jus soli,
from which the U.S. practice descended, was rolled back in 1981 to limit
birth citizenship to the children of at least one parent holding citizenship
or settled status (the British equivalent of permanent residence).116 But
the current approach extends citizenship to any person born in the United
Kingdom who has been present in the country for the first ten years of his
life.117 The rule carves out would-be happenstance citizens (birth tourism
would not work under U.K. law); at the same time it includes those who
are on a path to social membership. The approach is adequately inclusive
while reducing the false positives of absolute jus soli.
The constitutional source of the U.S. practice eliminates this as a real-
istic antidote to citizenship overreach. Even if it were not constitutionally
mandated, as some argue,118 putting the absolute rule on the table poses a
high risk-low reward proposition. The relatively marginal problem of citi-
zenship overreach is hardly worth sacrificing its inclusive virtues, the ad-
ministrative convenience of the absolute rule aside.
Rolling back jus sanguinis citizenship. Under current law, citizenship
automatically extends to children born outside the United States to a U.S.
citizen parent or parents where the parent meets the qualifying criteria.
No action is required on the part of the parent to secure citizenship for the
child.119
As with territorial birth citizenship, acquisition of citizenship on the
basis of descent is thus also non-consensual. To the extent that jus
sanguinis citizenship is over-inclusive, it could be modified to include ei-
ther an opt-in or an opt-out possibility. Some countries make jus sanguinis
citizenship contingent on registration of the child with consular authorities
in infancy, an opt-in element.120 Parental nonfeasance under a registration
116. British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61 §1 (Eng.).
117. Id. § 1(4). The provision allows a maximum ninety days of absence from the coun-
try during a ten-year period.
118. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 59, at 116-17; see also John C. Eastman, We Can
Apply the 14th Amendment While Also Reforming Birthright Citizenship, NAT’L REV., Aug.
24, 2015. Bills to limit the extension of citizenship to children of citizens and lawful perma-
nent residents are now routinely introduced in Congress. See, e.g., Birthright Citizenship Act
of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011).
119. Many parents do secure a “consular report of birth abroad,” but the document is
for evidentiary purposes only as proof of citizenship, not as a predicate to acquiring the
status. See, e.g., Chantal Panozzo, When American Expats Don’t Want Their Kids to Have
U.S. Citizenship, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2015 (noting that some parents hope to avoid a child’s
identification as citizen by failing to report birth, but that lack of report does not affect citi-
zenship status).
120. See Harald Waldrauch, Acquisition of Nationality, in 1 ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF
NATIONALITY: POLICIES AND TRENDS IN 15 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 121, 125 (Rainer
Baubo¨ck et al. eds., 2005) (identifying Finland, Sweden, and Denmark as examples of opt-in
countries); see also EUDO Database, supra note 24.
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scheme—not registering the birth of a child who is subsequently situated
as a social member of the national community—would be mitigated by
other elements of the nationality regime.121 Or, the United States could
innovate an opt-out mechanism under which a child would acquire citizen-
ship except where the parent notified U.S. authorities of a desire not to
have citizenship descend, so that the child would be deemed never to have
held the status. A final possibility would be to revive the former practice
of “election,” under which children born with dual citizenship and resident
abroad could choose their other nationality upon reaching adulthood, can-
celling U.S. citizenship in the process.122 That would have the advantage
of extending agency to the individual herself rather than imputing it
through the parent.123
Opt-in or opt-out would introduce an element of consent into the jus
sanguinis regime. Jus sanguinis citizenship is extended by statute; the mod-
ifications could be undertaken by amendment.124 But the change would
address only a small component of the problem, if only because citizenship
on the basis of parentage is less easily discovered than citizenship on the
basis of birthplace. It appears that fewer of those organizing against the
external tax regime have acquired citizenship by descent. They are either
better able to conceal their U.S. citizenship or unaware of it in the first
place. The legislative and administrative effort involved would probably
not be worth the gains from adopting a take it/leave it approach to citizen-
ship by descent.
Easy exit. More promising would be a broader facilitation of expatria-
tion for those who are not a part of the national community in terms of
social attachment. As described above, exiting citizenship under the cur-
rent regime is a complicated affair in even the most straightforward cases,
always involving a high fee and typically involving several years of tax
filings. In cases involving nominal citizenship, these exit requirements lack
proportionality. Frictionless expatriation would go a long way to remedy-
ing citizenship overreach. For some class of persons, expatriation should
be reduced to a no-fee, by-mail filing, and the tax regime should recognize
expatriation in these cases without any requirement of prior compliance.
The more difficult question would be how to draw the line on eligibil-
ity. For purposes of this paper, we will assume that barriers to exit are
justifiable with respect to those who are actual, not merely nominal, mem-
121. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (1994) (extending citizenship
automatically to a minor child in the custody of a citizen parent upon entry of the child into
the United States as a permanent resident).
122. See generally Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE
L.J. 693 (1921) (explaining the election mechanism).
123. This might be constitutionally required. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939)
(rejecting the effect of a parent’s naturalization in another country on the child’s status under
U.S. nationality law).
124. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (highlighting the nature of jus sanguinis
citizenship as a matter of statutory grant and legislative discretion). An opt-out mechanism
could also apply to jus soli citizenship, allowing a statutory patch to overcome the constitu-
tional constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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bers of the national community.125 Some cases are easily defined, the ones
that current law already aims to exempt from some barriers to exit, albeit
imperfectly. Those born with dual citizenship who have retained another
citizenship and who have not resided in the United States in adulthood
would be defined as happenstance citizens whose exit should be
unencumbered.
Long-term external residents should also probably be eligible for the
easy exit. Some period of continuous absence will typically equate to at-
tenuated homeland ties. This population is prominently represented in the
anti-FATCA protests. Assuming the justifiability of the exit tax in some
cases,126 one could adopt a sufficiently long timeline to minimize strategic
behavior, say, twenty years.127 After that period of non-residence in the
United States, a person holding another citizenship would be entitled to
the easy exit.
IV  CONCLUSION: AMERICANS ABROAD, LAYING LOW
The U.S. tax regime and FATCA controversy should be interesting to
citizenship scholars insofar as it highlights the possible costs of citizenship.
I hope it is also interesting to tax scholars insofar as it highlights citizen-
ship as an important moving part in the FATCA picture. The outcry from
those holding citizenship outside the United States is in part explained by
anomalous tax practices, but also by anomalous citizenship practices. The
FATCA episode foregrounds both. The story I have told here situates the
citizenship practice in a historical context that enables the interrogation, at
least, of the expansive allocation of U.S. citizenship and high barriers to
expatriation.
As a practical matter, many U.S. citizens abroad are probably in a
crouch, looking to wait things out. Renunciation is for keeps. If FATCA
and other onerous aspects of the U.S. tax regime are rolled back, some
might regret cutting the tie. They may have thick enough affective ties to
sustain citizenship so long as the costs are reasonable. There are also some
125. This proposition enjoys normative and pragmatic support. The normative argu-
ment works from the proposition that those who enjoy societal benefits should shoulder soci-
etal burdens, including tax obligations. See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). Practically
speaking, if an exit tax did not apply broadly to those with long-term social connections to
the national community, many would expatriate for the purpose of avoiding taxes on accu-
mulated capital gains. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 83, at 98 (noting one exit
tax objective to be to “protect the integrity of the system”). It also resonates in international
law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, bars only the arbitrary denial
of the right to change nationality. In some core cases, imposing an exit tax that in some way
replicates a tax imposed on those who do not leave should pass this arbitrariness test. See id.
at 95-99 (comparing tax obligations of those who leave and those who stay).
126. See, e.g., Alice Abreu, Taxing Exits, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087 (1996).
127. To prevent strategic avoidance in cases where high tax liabilities might incentivize
planning on even a long timeline, the level of assets triggering the exit tax could be raised
after a prolonged period of non-residence. In other words, the exit tax could be redrawn to
apply only to genuinely wealthy would-be renunciants after a lengthy period of external
residence.
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concrete benefits to the status, although those benefits will be low for indi-
viduals holding another premium passport. Enforcement remains anemic
enough that many will continue to get away with tax non-compliance.
Other new hassles—the difficulty in getting a bank account as foreign fi-
nancial institutions shun U.S. account holders—might be tolerable for the
short term. Some individuals no doubt are able to conceal the status for
the moment. Others are accreting tax compliance, positioning themselves
to cut bait if FATCA takes hold. Renunciations are growing, but they re-
main a trickle relative to the size of the external citizen population.128
That number may spike four or five years from now after would-be renun-
ciants have all their tax ducks lined up.
Others will now think twice about acquiring U.S. citizenship in the
first place. Important to the current controversy is the sandbagging ele-
ment. Those who acquired and retained citizenship decades ago are now
taking the hit in peak-earning years. Most would not have seen it coming,
complacent in the face of historically lax enforcement of the overseas tax
regime. Would-be citizens (and permanent residents) are now on notice.
Global elites might now even go out of their way not to give birth on U.S.
territory as a matter of strategic citizenship planning (a term that has en-
tered into the transnational lexicon).129 That will eliminate some of the
unfairness in the current regime. But many will be unable to evade the
tag—nonimmigrants for whom the inconvenience of giving birth else-
where will be onerous and those who will be extended jus sanguinis citi-
zenship regardless of place of birth, for example.
If there is a broader lesson here, it is in demonstrating the difficulty of
using citizenship as a platform for redistribution. Citizenship as an institu-
tion can no longer carry much weight because it no longer represents a
distinctive American national community.130 Assuming the citizenship re-
gime remains unchanged, the disconnect between status and community
will grow more pronounced, which will tend to further undermine the soli-
darities that citizenship once stood for.
128. According to the IRS, 3,415 Americans renounced in 2014. See Catherine Bosley
& Richard Rubin, A Record Number of Americans Are Renouncing Their Citizenship,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, Feb. 10, 2015. This number may represent an undercount. See Robert
W. Wood, IRS and FBI Track Americans Who Renounce Citizenship. Why Is FBI List
Longer?, FORBES, Sept. 21, 2015. One study of external citizens has an upper-end estimate of
7.6 million. See VON KOPPENFELS, supra note 20. The State Department recently pegged the
external citizen population at 9 million. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, BY THE NUMBERS (2015), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CA_
By_the_Numbers.pdf.
129. See, e.g., HENLEY & PARTNERS, Citizenship Planning: Citizenship of Choice, https:/
/www.henleyglobal.com/citizenship-planning/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
130. See generally PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER
GLOBALIZATION (2008).
